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Abstract 
In recent years, much emphasis has been placed in the policy discourse on the 
patenting of academic research outcomes. However, universities produce a wide 
variety of IP, not all of which is suitable to be patented, or which universities may 
choose not to patent. The present article, building upon an original survey of 46 
universities (about 27% of total) in the United Kingdom, investigates universities’ 
knowledge transfer processes through the exchange of a variety of forms of IP: 
patents, copyright, open source and non-patented innovations. The analysis concerns: 
(i) the extent to which universities exchange these forms of IP; (ii) whether they are 
used in a complementary or substitute way; and how relatively (iii) strategic effective 
and (iv) market efficient they are, in allowing universities to reach certain objectives 
(relating to knowledge transfer, competitive positioning, innovation and financial 
gain). We find that most universities perceive a variety of types of IP to be effective, 
usually in order to reach different strategic objectives. Certain forms of IP are use 
more than others for particular purposes, and no IP exchanges in the marketplace are 
exempt from institutional problems. Our results challenge the Bayh-Dole Act (now 
adopted in many OECD countries and elsewhere); i.e. whether patents and patent 
markets are the best tool for knowledge dissemination from research base into use, 
and other benefits, and whether instead it would be more appropriate to encourage 
universities to a variety of IP.  
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Introduction: looking beyond patents 
Universities are increasingly considered to be important contributors to the 
“knowledge economy” (Quah, 1998) and to national competitiveness. The provision 
of higher education (the transfer of knowledge to society by increasing human capital) 
and the production of new, cutting-edge research, are still regarded as the key 
functions of the university in the twenty-first century. At the same time, however, 
universities are increasingly required to engage in the direct transfer of their research 
outputs, in the form of new technologies and new intellectual property (IP), to 
economic partners such as firms and other organizations (Göransson et al, 2009). The 
metaphor of the university as an “ivory tower” where academics perform research in 
isolation, without interacting with external stakeholders, is no longer considered 
tenable: instead, active engagement in knowledge transfer has become a “third 
mission” for university institutions.  
The best way in which universities should accomplish their knowledge transfer 
objectives is debated by academics and policymakers. A growing body of research 
investigates the determinants and success of different models of knowledge transfer, 
analyzing the nature of the relationships through which new knowledge is produced 
and transmitted. Knowledge transfer can take place either through “open science” 
channels (conferences and publications, where the results of publicly-funded research 
are publicly disseminated), through direct collaborative relationships (joint ventures, 
contract research, consultancies, as well as sharing of research facilities and 
equipment), through employment-based channels (graduate recruitment, secondments 
at universities, exchange of personnel between industry and academia), and through 
the licensing or sale of university-owned patents. 
Another approach to investigating knowledge transfer involves exploring how 
universities exchange knowledge embedded in intellectual property rights (IPR) 
documents and in other intellectual property (IP) contracts. The literature that looks at 
the protection and exchange of university-produced IP mostly investigates patents 
and/or publications as alternative systems of dissemination. It has been pointed out 
that there are partial incompatibilities between the two systems, which have been 
explored at some length in the literature (Blumenthal et al, 1986; Eisenberg, 1996). 
However, universities produce a wide variety of IP, not all of which is suitable to be 
patented and which cannot be codified in the form of scientific publications either. 
Universities may also choose not to patent even if they could in principle do so.  
Some authors have recognized that the exchange of IP that is not embedded in patents 
but that is traded via other types of contracts (such as copyright, open source, 
confidentiality agreements, or simply non-protected innovations) is quantitatively 
very important for organizations (Klevorick et al, 1987) and for universities in 
particular (Landry et al, 2007). The use and exchange of these forms of IP on the part 
of universities is nonetheless under-explored in the literature investigating university-
industry knowledge transfer (Baghurst et al, 2009). 
The present article, building upon the original UKNOW survey (see section 3 for 
details) of 46 universities (about 27% of full population) in the United Kingdom, 
makes a contribution towards filling this analytical gap.   
Going beyond the narrow focus on patents and publications that characterizes most 
contemporary literature, the analysis concerns: (i) the extent to which universities 
exchange a variety of different forms of IP, not limited to patents and to openly 
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disseminated knowledge codified in publications, but also include open source and 
non-patented inventions; (ii) whether these forms of IP are used in a complementary 
or substitute way; and whether some of these are more (iii) effective and (iv) efficient 
in order to reach certain strategic benefits (relating to knowledge transfer, competitive 
positioning, innovation and financial gain) . 
The article is organized as follows. In section 2, we argue that, in order to improve 
our understanding of how universities use their intellectual property (IP) for value 
creation (including knowledge transfer, competitive positioning, innovation and 
financial gain), it is important to capture a variety of types of IP market transactions 
(patents, copyright, open source and no protection). Also, we need to investigate the 
extent to which such transactions happen efficiently, in terms of what obstacles 
universities encounter in the IP marketplaces. In the context of this discussion, we 
present the research questions that we address. In section 3 we present the data, and in 
section 4 we present our analysis and the results. In section 5 we conclude and add 
some implications of our results for policy. 
 
2. Intellectual property management in universities: issues and research 
questions 
A large body of literature has been developed, especially in recent years, which looks 
at the relative importance of different models of knowledge transfer, often linked to 
different types of research processes that generate new knowledge. These processes 
can take place exclusively within the university as a result of public funding, within 
the university but with full or partial funding from the private sector, or in 
collaboration between universities and firms or other organizations.  Correspondingly, 
knowledge transfer can take place either through “open science” channels 
(conferences and publications, where the results of publicly-funded research are 
publicly disseminated), through direct collaborative relationships (joint ventures, 
contract research, consultancies, as well as sharing of research facilities and 
equipment), through employment-based channels (graduate recruitment, secondments 
at universities, exchange of personnel between industry and university), and through 
the licensing or sale of university-owned patents.  
When seen from the perspective of firms, the relative importance of these models 
varies. The literature has shown that most firms prefer to access university knowledge 
through open science channels, employment relationships, and collaborations. Use 
(buying and licensing) of university-owned patents generally tends to rank low in 
importance for this purpose (Bruneel et al, 2009; Cohen et al, 2002; Mowery and 
Sampat, 2005; Póvoa and Rapini, 2010). Numerous empirical studies have also 
pointed out that firms’ interactions with university depend upon size (larger firms 
have more collaborations), R&D intensity (more R&D intensive firms collaborate 
more, thanks to their greater absorptive capacity), distance (but the latter is not always 
important and not for all firms), technological sector (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002; 
Bekkers and Bodas Freitas, 2008; Póvoa and Rapini, 2010) 
When investigated from the perspective of universities, it has been argued that these 
different models are appropriate to different disciplines and different types of 
institutions, as well as to different institutional and cultural contexts (Litan et al, 2007, 
Perkmann et al, 2010)). Generally, universities derive more income from 
collaborative research, including contract research and consultancy, than from 
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licensing of patents (D’Este and Perkmann, 2007) and university income from patent 
licensing is generally very skewed (Blake, 1993), more so than in other industries 
(Hicks et al., 2001). 
Nonetheless, in recent years, much emphasis has been placed in the policy discourse 
on the patenting of academic research outcomes, on the basis of the view that 
university ownership of patents facilitates the codification of academic knowledge in 
a form that can be more easily used and commercially exploited by industry (Berman, 
2008). On the one hand, since the approval of the Bayh-Dole act in 1980, numerous 
countries have passed legislation allowing universities to claim patents on the results 
of publicly-funded research, including those countries where it was previously 
customary to assign the ownership of IP to the faculty that had invented it (Geuna and 
Nesta, 2006). Following this wave of regulations (Crespi et al, 2006), the number of 
patents filed by universities has increased (Geuna and Nesta, 2006; Lissoni et al, 
2009). On the other hand, the performance of university institutions in terms of 
knowledge transfer is increasingly measured on the basis of indicators tracking the 
intensity with which they patent their research results: frequently used performance 
indicators are the number of patents filed and licensed, the income from patent 
licensing activities, the number of academic spinout companies created in order to 
exploit university patents (see e.g. HEFCE, 2007). This provides a strong incentive 
for the application of this model of knowledge transfer (Allan, 2001; Sorensen and 
Chambers, 2008). 
However, universities produce a wide variety of IP, not all of which is suitable to be 
patented (or which universities may choose not to patent even if they could in 
principle do so) and which cannot be codified in the form of scientific publications 
either. Baghurst et al (2009) distinguish between “hard” IP, which can be protected 
through patents, and “soft IP” which is generally not patented. These forms of IP are 
very important, for example, for those universities whose knowledge base resides 
primarily in the social sciences and in the arts and humanities.  
As pointed out by Baghurst et al (2009), despite the importance of soft IP for 
universities, the issues relating to its generation, identification, commercial 
exploitation and value are systematically under-explored. While there have been some 
studies on the complementary use of different forms of IP protection, these have 
generally involved sectors other than universities. Moreover, most studies on 
alternative IP protection mechanisms focus only on proprietary IP, looking at the role 
of trademarks, design registrations, copyright (Graham and Somaya, 2006; Ramello 
and Silva, 2006) and neglecting non-proprietary forms of IP
1
. Only a few case studies 
have aimed at uncovering how software firms use both open source and patents as 
part of their commercial strategies (Campbell-Kelly and Garcia-Swartz, 2008). 
Moreover, with some exceptions, most of the literature assumes that different IP 
protection mechanisms are substitutes rather than complements, despite the lack of 
evidence in this respect (Nelson, 2006; Teece, 2006). 
Such lack of attention for the variety of forms of IP that universities can use has not 
                                                          
1
 In the following analysis, we use the term “proprietary IP” (or, equally, intellectual property rights, 
IPR) for IP upon which restrictions on use, sharing, copying and modification are enforced by legal 
means (namely, patents and copyright), and “non-proprietary IP” for IP on which some or all of these 
restrictions are relaxed (namely, open source and non-patented innovations). This classification differs 
from that used by Baghurst et al (2009) who use the term “hard IP” to refer to patents, and “soft IP” to 
all other types of intellectual property protection mechanisms. 
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only characterized the academic literature of knowledge transfer. It has been argued 
that universities themselves, and policymakers, have not paid enough attention to the 
existence and need for different models of IP protection that go beyond the use of 
patents and publications. Macdonald (2009) argues that most universities have 
adopted a model of technology transfer that is typical of the pharmaceutical industry, 
one of the heaviest users of the patent system. However, in most other industries 
(such as in software and electronics) firms exploit their technological advantage 
through trade secrets, marketing strategy and lead times, rather than through patents 
(Klevorick et al., 1987): a model of knowledge transfer based on patent licensing 
from universities is unlikely to fit these firms’ business models. Consequently, 
university managers tend to overvalue patents, while they should be focusing instead 
on different procedures, methods, and goals for differing industries (Macdonald, 
2009). 
The empirical analysis presented in this article, building upon an original survey of 
university technology transfer offices in the United Kingdom, allows us to contribute 
to this area of analysis. 
First, considering a variety of forms of IP that are exchanged by universities, we 
investigate whether universities use them in a complementary or substitute way, by 
exploring two research questions:  
(i) whether more than one form of IP (patent, copyright, open source IP, and 
non-patented technical invention) is exchanged at the same time (the 
variety of IP used is discussed in section 4.2), and  
(ii) whether different forms of IP are used for different strategic objectives of 
the universities (knowledge transfer, competitive positioning, innovation 
and financial gain) or whether they are used for the same objective (the 
complementarity or substitution between different forms of IP is discussed 
in section 4.3)  
Second, we consider the ways in which the exchange of IP stimulates the wealth 
creation process from IP, and we investigate two further research questions: 
(iii) which forms of IP do universities find more effective, in terms of 
conferring certain benefits (this is discussed in section 4.4); and  
(iv) which forms of IP do they find more efficient to use (i.e. universities find 
less market obstacles when exchanging that form of IP) (this is discussed 
in section 4.5). 
The UKNOW survey (see section 3) providing the data for this analysis, asked 
universities not only to describe which of four forms of IP they exchange (indicated in 
the left column of Table 1), but also which specific governance forms they use in 
order to carry out such IP exchanges (indicated in the right column). 
Table 1. Marketplaces and governance forms investigated through the UKNOW 
survey  
Forms of IP Governance structures 
Patents as a tool for the protection of 
novel ideas 
Selling patents 
Buying patents 
Out-licensing patents 
In-licensing patents 
Cross licensing patents 
Participation in patent pools 
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Copyright as a tool for the protection 
of original creative expressions 
Selling copyright 
Buying copyright 
Out-licensing copyright 
In licensing copyright 
Open source’ IP as a tool for the 
protection of original ideas and 
creative expressions 
Participating in open source software development 
Participating in open source pharmaceutical projects 
Participating in other open source communities 
‘Non patented’ innovations 
Releasing not patented product or process innovations to the 
public 
Releasing not patented product or process innovations to 
private firms 
Using not patented product or process innovations 
Collaborating with universities without patent restrictions 
 
In order to investigate the extent to which these forms of IP are used in a 
complementary or substitute way, we analyze the strategic objectives that underpin 
the universities’ exchange of each form of IP, that is the benefits that they seek from 
these exchanges. The identification of such benefits is based on a review of the 
economic literature, where motivations for engaging in holding and exchanging IP 
have been investigated mostly with respect to patents. Some studies have looked in 
detail at the determinants of engagement in open source development (David and 
Shapiro, 2008) but very few have investigated motivations in a comparative 
perspective.  
It has been argued that patenting promotes innovation because it allows the inventor 
to invest more financial resources in research (Arrow, 1962), thus developing more 
and better technology; and conversely, the acquisition of patents allows the buyer to 
use the best technology available. Patent licensing enables standardization and 
compatibility among technologies (Merges and Nelson, 1990; Plant, 1934), while 
patent exchanges in general allow to build strategic relationships with or within 
industry (Jaffe et al, 1993; Teece, 1986), which furthers innovation diffusion. Patents 
also have a wide range of direct and direct economic benefits. Not only the exchange 
of patents can be a direct source of income, but patents can be held or exchanged for 
strategic purposes, in order to influence the process of competition (Mazzoleni and 
Nelson, 1998).  
There are at several economic reasons why firms file or acquire patents (Graham and 
Sichelman 2008). Firms can file patents for defensive purposes, in order to stop others 
from imitating their product (Rivette and Kline, 2000; Cohen et al., 2000; Granstrand, 
1999), but they can also use them offensively, in order to block competitors from 
using certain technologies, or as bargaining chips in cross-licensing negotiations. 
Other ways in which patents can increase one’s market share at the expense of 
competitors include the attempt to drive up the competitors’ costs, to gain access to 
their technologies, to prevent them from acquiring patents on the same inventions, or 
even to push them out of the market. Patents are also used for financial purposes, for 
example to increase one’s chances to secure investment, to be acquired or taken 
public in an initial public offering, or just to increase the value of one’s assets in 
bankruptcy (Coriat and Orsi, 2002; Rivette and Kline, 2000); for signalling purposes, 
in that patents can be interpreted as a proxy for internal capabilities and assets; and for 
reputation purposes, since patents can serve as assets that increase the value of the 
firm and of its brand (Grassman, et al 2009). On the other hand, the registration and 
maintenance of IPRs require the payment of fees that can constitute a significant 
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financial burden especially for small enterprises: involvement in open source and in 
exchanges of non-patented innovations therefore can confer economic benefits in 
terms of ability to cut costs.  
We have summarized the main motivations for exchanging IP, as identified by the 
literature. They are divided into 13 possible strategic benefits, and are listed in the 
right-hand column of Table 2. The organizations that responded to the UKNOW 
survey were asked to tick the five most important. 
Table 2. Strategic benefits investigated through the survey  
Type of strategic benefit Specific benefit 
Knowledge transfer 
Building informal relationships with industry networks 
Increasing ability to enter collaborative agreements 
Giving something to the community 
Competitive positioning 
Increasing market share  
Professional recognition or brand recognition;  
Competitive signalling 
Innovation 
Using the best inventions, innovations, creative expressions 
Making or using compatible technology or creative expressions 
Developing better technology or creative expressions 
Benefiting from user or supplier involvement as a development strategy 
Financial gain 
Direct income from market transactions 
Cost cutting 
Increasing ability to raise venture capital 
These benefits capture the broad ways in which universities exchange flows of 
knowledge and financial resources with external organizations (listed in the left-hand 
column of table 2). On the one hand we have direct knowledge flows from university 
to external sources, firms or government (which we term “knowledge transfer”) and 
the diffusion of university knowledge through market mechanism and through 
creating market awareness (which we term “competitive positioning”); on the other 
hand, we have flows of knowledge that feeds back into universities’ innovation 
processes (which we term “innovation”) and financial gain from firms and other 
organizations to universities.  
Finally, we investigate which IP mechanisms universities find more effective (i.e. 
better at conferring certain strategic benefits, see Table 2) and more efficient (i.e. 
universities find less obstacles when exchanging that form of IP in the marketplace). 
So far the literature has mostly focused on the advantages and limitations of patents in 
stimulating or hampering these flows: therefore, extending this analysis to other forms 
of IP is an original contribution. To do so, we combine an analysis of the strategic 
benefits that universities seek from different forms of IP, with an analysis of the 
obstacles that they encounter when exchanging IP.  
The identification of these obstacles is based on a review of the literature and of 
industry reports. The main problems identified often concern the negotiation and 
enforcement of IPR contracts: it is difficult to value patents and to define their 
boundaries (Merges and Nelson, 1990), and the patent’s value usually depends on its 
intended utilization, thus making it difficult to negotiate an appropriate price for it 
(Mansfield et. al., 1981; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). Negotiations are complicated also 
by unbalanced bargaining power, asymmetric information and lack of trust, since 
opportunistic behaviour is common in business dealings (Bachmann, 2006). Even 
when contracts can be made, enforcing them is costly, both in terms of direct legal 
costs and in terms of business costs of litigation. Enforcement problems have also 
been studied with respect to open source, where it has been pointed out that 
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difficulties rise when the licensee fails to comply with the terms and conditions set by 
the licensor, for example by appropriating and closing up the source code (merging it 
with new code and releasing it in a proprietary way, such as “all rights reserved”) or 
by failing to apply the same terms and conditions to derivative works (Montagnani, 
2009). Other problems, which have been identified for example with respect to the 
software industry (IBM 2006) have to do with lack of transparency in the marketplace 
(difficulty to identify the owner, uncertainty as to what the right price is, impossibility 
to make sense of text and diagrams in patent documents), lack of integrity (poor 
behaviour and unjust court cases), and low patent quality (too many similar patents 
with no inventive step, which in turn makes it difficult for firms to assess their degree 
of novelty and understand their economic value). Such obstacles to value creation 
have also been discussed in Bessen and Meurer (2005). 
Universities that responded to the UKNOW survey were asked to tick the five most 
relevant obstacles (from the list of 14 possible obstacles presented in Table 3) when 
exchanging each type of IP. 
Table 3. Obstacles investigated through the survey  
Type of obstacle Specific obstacle 
Search problems   
Difficulty in locating the owners of IP 
Difficulty in locating the users of IP 
Difficulty in finding the best IP 
Lack of transparency 
Difficulty in assessing the degree of novelty/originality of the IP 
Lack of clarity of the IP document  
Difficulty in assessing the economic value of the IP 
Contract negotiation 
Difficulty in negotiating a price for the IP 
Difficulty in negotiating the terms, not related to price, of the contract 
Contract enforcement 
Excessive cost of enforcing the contract 
Problems, not related to cost, with enforcing the contract 
Trust issues (opportunistic behaviour, free-riding, or similar) 
Regulation and practices 
Different practices of firms 
Regulations allow too exclusive rights 
International IP regulations do not fit the needs of different local markets 
 
3. Data overview 
The empirical analysis is based upon the data collected through an empirical survey of 
a sample of universities, colleges and public research organizations based in England, 
Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. For simplicity, we refer to this sample as to “UK 
universities”, as less than 25% of the sample (and of the set of respondents) are non-
university institutions. The UKNOW survey
2
 was carried out between October 2008 
and March 2009. The survey was targeted to technology transfer offices and similar 
units within the institution. The respondents within such units usually possess a broad 
view of their institution’s involvement in IP exchanges, as a large share of the 
contracts governing IP transactions are managed by their offices. Consequently, they 
have experience of the obstacles encountered when attempting to exchange such IP 
efficiently, and they have some knowledge of the relative strategic advantages of the 
                                                          
2
 The UKNOW survey was designed and carried out at Birkbeck College (under the coordination of 
Birgitte Andersen) under Work Package 3.2: "An IPR Regime in Support of a Knowledge Based 
Economy", as part of the UKNOW (Understanding the Relationship between Knowledge and 
Competitiveness in the Enlarging EU’) project of the EU 6th Framework Programme (contract number 
CIT 028519). 
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different forms of IP as a consequence of the interactions with the researchers 
themselves. 
The sample of relevant institutions, and of their respective technology transfer offices, 
was created by merging the list of 120 members of the University Companies 
Association (UNICO), which represents the technology exploitation companies of UK 
universities, and the list of 162 institutions that responded to the HEBCI 2004-05 and 
2005-06 surveys (HEFCE, 2007), which includes all the 133 universities in the UK, 
as well as some colleges of higher education and public research organizations. After 
correcting different spellings and eliminating double entries, a final population of 169 
different organizations was assembled. Respondents had a choice of different options 
through which they could answer the survey: filling in the questionnaire available 
online; returning an electronic copy of the questionnaire by email; returning a copy of 
the questionnaire by post or fax. We obtained 46 valid responses (27.2% response 
rate). 
The questions referred, separately, to four proprietary and non-proprietary 
marketplaces governing the exchange of IP: patents, copyright, open source and non-
patented innovations. In turn, for each marketplace, the questions referred to different 
IP governance structures, as detailed in Table 1. 
A first set of questions allowed us to collect information on the extent and intensity 
with which universities participate in the various IP marketplaces and governance 
structures. Respondents were asked about their stock of patents owned and licensed, 
whether they engaged in each patent governance form, and if so the number of 
transactions they performed in the last two years. With respect to open source, non-
patented technology and copyright, universities were asked whether they engaged in 
each governance form, and if so the number of transactions they realized in the last 
two years. 
A second set of questions referred to the benefits that university technology transfer 
offices seek when trading IP. For each marketplace and governance form, respondents 
were presented with a list of 13 strategic benefits (listed in Table 2) among which 
they were asked to tick up to five that they deemed most important.  
Respondents were then asked about the obstacles they encountered when trading IP. 
They were presented with a list of 14 obstacles (listed in Table 3) among which they 
were asked to tick up to five that they deemed of highest impact. 
Finally, respondents were requested to provide some general information about the 
organization: geographic localization, ownership (independent or subsidiary), size 
(current number of employees, current yearly turnover), research intensity (yearly 
expenditure in R&D), geographic extension of the organization’s main market 
(domestic or international), and sector of activity.  
A few additional variables relating to organizational characteristics were derived from 
other sources. In particular, the number of academic staff and total staff (academic, 
non-academic, atypical) of the institution (relative to 2007/08), the share of academic 
staff employed in scientific fields (engineering and technology, medicine and natural 
sciences, in the same period), and the income of the institution were drawn from 
HESA’s (the Higher Education Statistics Agency) database. The year of foundation of 
the technology transfer office and the number of staff employed within were drawn 
from the 2007 HE-BCI survey (HEFCE, 2007).  
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4. Analysis  
 
4.1. Representativeness of respondents 
The organizations in the sample possess different institutional and historical features. 
Most are universities, some are university colleges or other institutions of higher 
education (such as music conservatoires and arts colleges), and a few are public 
research organizations. Table 4 compares the distribution of institutions in the overall 
sample and in the sets of respondents and non-respondents, across several main 
characteristics: geographical localization, size (in terms of academic staff employed), 
institutional type, both with respect to status and to historical origin (distinguishing 
between universities, other higher education institutions and public research 
organizations, and further subdividing universities into 5 categories according to the 
period in which they were founded
3
). The distribution of respondents by geographical 
localization, institutional type and size in terms of total staff (academic, non-academic 
and atypical) is representative of the overall sample (p-values of the t-tests for the 
subsets of respondents and non-respondents are reported in brackets).  
Table 4. Structure of sample and respondents 
 
sample (169) 
respondents 
(46) 
non-respondents 
(123) 
% % % 
geographic 
localization 
England 82.2 89.1 79.7 
  (0.264) (0.580) 
Wales 5.3 4.3 5.7 
  (0.791) (0.893) 
Scotland 11.2 6.5 13 
  (0.351) (0.648) 
Northern Ireland 1.2 0 1.6 
  (0.461) (0.749) 
Total 100 100 100 
Type 
“old” universities 5.9 8.7 4.9 
  (0.501) (0.701) 
“red brick” universities 17.8 26.1 14.6 
  (0.208) (0.480) 
“plate-glass” universities 13.6 15.2 13 
  (0.781) (0.882) 
“former polytechnics" 20.7 19.6 21.1 
  (0.865) (0.929) 
“modern” universities 16.6 8.7 19.5 
  (0.185) (0.518) 
university colleges 16.6 8.7 19.5 
  (0.185) (0.518) 
public research organizations 7.7 13 5.7 
  (0.259) (0.505) 
Other 1.2 0 1.6 
  (0.461) (0.749) 
Total 100 100 100 
size (total 
staff) 
<500 10.7 4.3 13.0 
  (0.194) (0.537) 
                                                          
3
 The categories are the following: “old” universities (founded before the mid-XIX century); “red 
brick” universities (founded between the mid-XIX century and the mid-XX century); “plate glass” 
universities (founded between the 1960s and the end of the 1980s); “former polytechnics” (institutions 
formerly designated “polytechnics” which changed their status to universities in 1992); “modern” 
universities (founded after 1992, not formerly designated “polytechnics”).  
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500-1000 13.0 10.9 13.8 
  (0.486) (0.728) 
1000-5000 47.3 56.5 43.9 
  (0.197) (0.497) 
>5000 24.3 28.3 22.8 
  (0.923) (0.960) 
Missing 4.7 0.0 6.5 
  (0.134) (0.513) 
Total 100 100 100 
 
4.2. Variety of IP exchanged by universities 
We first investigate research question (i) concerning whether universities exchange 
more than one form of IP (patent, copyright, open source IP, and non-patented 
technical invention) at the same time. 
Of the 46 respondents, 13 do not exchange any of the four forms of IP considered. Of 
the respondents that exchange IP, only 10 (30%) exchange just one form, while most 
(23, that is 70%) exchange two or more (9 exchange two different forms of IP, 10 
exchange three, and 4 exchange all four). In particular, 9 organizations (27%) only 
exchange proprietary forms of IP (patents and/or copyright), two organizations (6%) 
exchange only non-proprietary IP, while most use a combination of proprietary and 
non-proprietary forms of protection of their IP (22 organizations, or 67%). This 
suggests that most universities exchange a variety of forms IP, both proprietary and 
non-proprietary. 
According to a Probit regression on the set of 46 respondents, the choice as to 
whether to exchange IP (of any kind) is significantly affected by the presence of an 
internal technology transfer office: having internal competences in technology 
transfer increases the probability to exchange IP with external organizations. Being a 
public research organization has a positive effect on the likelihood to exchange IP, 
while being a college of higher education has a negative effect. As the former 
organizations in our sample tend to be specialized in medicine and biotechnology, 
while the latter specialize in the arts, their different likelihood to exchange IP may be 
due to their disciplinary specializations. However, the share of academic staff in 
science and technology has a negative effect on the likelihood to exchange IP. It may 
be that, once we control for the subset of public research organizations, those 
universities that have a larger share of academic staff in science and technology prefer 
to rely on dissemination systems based on traditional open science channels rather 
than on the transfer of IP. Finally, the age and size of the institution in terms of 
academic staff, as well as the type of university institution in terms of historical 
origins, do not significantly affect the choice to exchange IP.  
Table 5. Probit regression on the choice to exchange IP 
 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 0.999(***) 0.255 3.910 0.000 
Age -0.001 0.001 -0.950 0.349 
Number of academic 
staff 
0.000 0.000 0.325 0.747 
Presence of TTO 0.337(*) 0.186 1.810 0.079 
Share of academic -0.834(**) 0.332 -2.515 0.017 
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staff in science & 
technology 
Public research 
organization 
0.562(*) 0.296 1.896 0.066 
University college  -0.698(**) 0.326 -2.139 0.039 
Former polytechnic 0.308 0.242 1.275 0.211 
“Old” university 0.470 0.377 1.249 0.220 
“Red brick” university 0.082 0.226 0.364 0.718 
”Plate glass” university 0.087 0.259 0.337 0.738 
n. observations 46  
Log-likelihood -18.39895    
AIC 60.798    
Signif. codes: p<0.01 ‘***’ p<0.05 ‘**’ p<0.1  ‘*’ 
Considering the subset of 33 universities that exchange IP, the number of different 
forms of IP that they exchange is, according to a Poisson regression whose results are 
reported in Table 6, positively affected by size in terms of academic staff. A greater 
number of academic staff may indicate greater variety in terms of disciplines offered 
and hence greater likelihood to exchange different forms of IP. Age per se has a 
negative effect on the variety of IP that is exchanged, however being a “old” 
university founded before 1850 has a positive effect. As old universities tend to be 
more research oriented and also to be less specialized, this may indicate that these 
universities produce a wider variety of research outcomes. Also being a former 
polytechnic has a positive effect on the number of different forms of IP that are 
exchanged. Although these universities are generally not very research intensive, they 
tend to dedicate a lot of effort to interactions with businesses and other external 
organizations, which may explain the greater variety of IP exchanged. Being a 
university as opposed to another type of institution, has a negative effect on the 
likelihood to exchange IP. Finally, having an internal technology transfer office has 
no significant effect on the variety of IP exchanged.  
 
Table 6. Poisson regression on the variety of IP exchanged 
 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 4.693 (***) 1.364 3.441 0.003 
Age -0.005 (*) 0.002 -1.913 0.070 
Number of academic staff 0.000 (**) 0.000 2.740 0.013 
Presence of TTO 0.113 0.432 0.262 0.796 
Share of academic staff in 
science & technology 
0.116 0.995 0.116 0.909 
University -1.868 (*) 1.027 -1.819 0.084 
Public research 
organization 
-1.140 1.424 -0.800 0.433 
University college  -1.414 1.343 -1.053 0.305 
Former polytechnic 1.542 (**) 0.590 2.615 0.017 
“Old” university 2.435 (**) 0.890 2.735 0.013 
“Red brick” university 0.845 0.574 1.473 0.156 
”Plate glass” university 0.607 0.710 0.855 0.403 
England -1.791 (**) 0.728 -2.460 0.023 
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n. observations 33    
Log-likelihood -33.26807    
AIC 94.536    
Signif. codes: p<0.01 ‘***’ p<0.05 ‘**’ p<0.1  ‘*’ 
The greater size of the institution allows it to broaden the scope of its activities and 
exchange a variety of IP
4
. If we consider the distinction between exchanges of 
proprietary IP and exchanges of non-proprietary IP, we find (from the descriptive 
statistics shown in Table 7) that universities that use only proprietary or only non-
proprietary IP are smaller, in terms of income and staff, than those that use both types. 
Universities that exchange only non-proprietary IP are less involved in the sciences 
(their share of academic staff in medicine, engineering and technology and natural 
sciences is smaller); while those that use both proprietary and non-proprietary 
marketplaces are on average larger (both in terms of income and number of staff) and 
have a larger number of technology transfer staff, than all other groups. 
Table 7. Distribution of university characteristics according to participation in 
proprietary and non-proprietary IP marketplaces 
 
average 
income 
average 
number of 
staff 
year of 
foundation 
average 
number of TT 
staff 
average share 
of academic 
staff in science 
at least one IP 
marketplace  
(n=36) 19,562,964 4,795.00 1884 36.00 0.44 
only 
proprietary 
(n=9) 
12,286,669 1,745.56 1884 24.00 0.31 
only non- 
proprietary 
(n=2) 
48,114 880.00 1932 16.00 0.18 
both 
proprietary 
and non-
proprietary 
(n=22) 
21,646,031 5,526.36 1879 43.09 0.38 
 
In sum, we find that most organizations that exchange IP use a variety of forms of IP, 
often both proprietary and non-proprietary. Greater variety in the exchange of IP 
appears linked to organizational characteristics such as younger age, larger size and 
being a certain type of institution (specifically, being a older university or a former 
polytechnic). 
 
4.3. Complementarity between different forms of IP 
In order to explore research question (ii), we investigate whether the various forms of 
IP are used in order to reach the same objectives (that is, they are used as substitutes) 
                                                          
4
 If, in the regression whose results are presented in Table 6, we consider, instead of the number of 
academic staff, the number of total staff present in the institution (not just academic but also 
administrative and technical) this has an even stronger positive effect on the likelihood to exchange IP. 
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or whether they are used to reach different objectives (that is, they complement each 
other). 
Table 8 summarizes the answers given by respondents with respect to the benefits that 
they derive from exchanging different forms of IP. Columns do not sum to 100% 
since universities could tick more than one benefit. Shares greater than 50% are 
highlighted. 
Table 8. Benefits from exchange of various types of IP 
 patent Copyright open source 
non-patented 
innovations 
Respondents in each IP marketplace 29 15 12 18 
 % % % % 
KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER 65.5 66.7 83.3 72.2 
Building informal relationships with 
industry networks 
58.6 53.3 58.3 0.0 
Increasing ability to enter 
collaborative agreements 
48.3 40.0 58.3 50.0 
Giving something to the community 17.2 20.0 58.3 55.6 
COMPETITIVE POSITIONING 27.6 66.7 16.7 44.4 
Increasing market share 10.3 40.0 0.0 5.6 
Professional recognition or brand 
recognition 
17.2 33.3 16.7 27.8 
Competitive signalling 6.9 6.7 0.0 11.1 
INNOVATION 31.0 46.7 58.3 61.1 
Being able to use the best creative 
expressions 
6.9 6.7 33.3 22.2 
Benefiting from user or supplier 
involvement as a development 
strategy 
0.0 33.3 25.0 16.7 
Providing an opportunity to make or 
use compatible creative expressions 
20.7 6.7 41.7 55.6 
Innovation methodology: developing 
better creative expressions 
13.8 13.3 33.3 16.7 
FINANCIAL GAIN 65.5 66.7 0.0 50.0 
Direct income from market 
transaction 
58.6 60.0 0.0 44.4 
Cost cutting 6.9 13.3 0.0 5.6 
Increasing ability to raise venture 
capital 
37.9 13.3 0.0 11.1 
 
The objective to transfer knowledge to industry and other stakeholders is the main 
reason for universities to exchange all forms of IP, and particularly non-proprietary 
IP. The specific benefits relating to knowledge transfer however differ according to 
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the form of IP that is exchanged: open source and non-patented innovations are 
exchanged in order to increase the university’s ability to enter collaborative 
agreements and to give something to the community, while patents and copyright 
particularly allow universities to build informal relationships with industry networks. 
The other types of benefits are even more specific to certain forms of IP. Benefits 
relating to competitive positioning are particularly sought when exchanging 
copyright, while benefits relating to innovation are particularly sought when 
exchanging open source and non-patented innovations (non-proprietary IP) and 
benefits relating to financial gain (in the form of direct income) are particularly 
sought when exchanging patents and copyright (proprietary IP). 
As the choice of different benefits is associated to the exchange of different forms of 
IP, these results suggest that such forms of IP are complementary rather than 
substitutes for one another. This is supported by the analysis of the specific IP 
governance forms that universities engage in. Most universities are active in selling 
and/or out-licensing patents and copyright, while very few buy or in-license them
5
. 
By selling and out-licensing patents and copyright, universities transfer knowledge to 
external agents (in the case of copyright, they also promote knowledge diffusion via 
market mechanisms) and receive flows of financial resources. When universities and 
public research organizations exchange non-proprietary IP, instead, they tend to both 
release and acquire it
6
. By participating in open source communities and by releasing 
and using non-patented innovations, universities transfer knowledge to external 
agents, and receive flows of knowledge that are important for their own innovation 
processes. 
 
4.4. The presumed effectiveness of different forms of IP in reaching strategic 
benefits 
In order to analyze which forms of IP are regarded as relatively more effective in 
reaching various strategic benefits, addressing research question (iii), we quantify the 
presumed relative comparative advantage of each form of IP (each “IP marketplace”), 
and of each governance form (see Table 1) through which IP is exchanged, in 
reaching a certain benefit, relative to the others. 
                                                          
5
 Of the 29 organizations that engage in the patent marketplace, most (28) engage in out-licensing 
patents, and many (17) are active in selling patents, while comparatively few engage in in-licensing (5) 
buying (4) cross-licensing (5) or participating in patent pools (4). Universities tend to file their own 
patents rather than in-license them from other organizations, since the total stock of in-licensed patents 
is a small fraction (about 7%) of the total stock of owned patents. The organizations using copyright 
were not requested to detail their involvement in the various governance forms for copyright, but 
simply to state whether they engaged in registering their copyright. From their choices of benefits and 
obstacles in each governance form, however, we find that at least 9 are active in selling copyright, at 
least 3 in buying copyright, at least 12 in out-licensing copyright and at least 6 in in-licensing 
copyright. As in the case of patents, selling and out-licensing are the most frequent forms of 
engagement in this kind of proprietary IP marketplace.  
6
 All of the 12 organizations that are active in open source do so in the field of software, while 3 are 
also active in open source pharmaceuticals and 3 in other open source communities. Of the 18 
organizations that engage in markets for non-patented technology, most are active in most of the 
different governance forms: releasing non-patented technology to the public (15) or to private firms 
(12), using non-patented technology (16) and collaborating with other universities without patent 
restrictions (15).  
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To do so, we develop a “revealed marketplace advantage” (or “revealed governance 
advantage”) index that measures the importance of a benefit in a certain marketplace 
(or governance form) relative to the importance of the same benefit across all 
marketplaces (or governance forms)7. This index only assumes positive values: a 
value that is greater than 1 indicates that that marketplace (or governance form) is 
regarded as particularly important at stimulating a certain benefit, while the opposite 
holds when the value is less than 1. 
Table 9 provides an overview of results of revealed marketplace (RMA) and 
governance (RGA) advantage indexes, computed for the four types of knowledge and 
resource flows identified
8
. Values of the index greater than 1 are highlighted. 
Table 9. ‘Revealed advantage index’ for the various benefits 
Marketplace / governance form 
RMA / RGA index 
Knowledge 
transfer 
Competitive 
advantage 
Innovation 
Financial 
gain 
Patents 0.64 0.23 0.63 1.38 
Selling patents 0.95 1.20 0.51 1.21 
Buying patents 0.00 6.81 0.00 0.00 
Out-licensing patents 1.10 0.80 0.90 1.04 
In-licensing patents 0.80 1.24 2.09 0.54 
Cross licensing patents 0.98 0.76 1.91 0.65 
Participation in patent pools 0.98 0.00 1.91 0.98 
Copyright 0.50 0.42 0.72 1.08 
Selling copyright 1.06 0.91 0.63 1.21 
Buying copyright 0.58 1.16 2.43 0.58 
Out-licensing copyright 0.98 0.98 1.14 0.98 
In licensing copyright 1.16 1.16 0.61 0.87 
Open source 0.97 0.17 1.41 0.00 
Participating in open source 
software development 
1.01 1.21 0.94 n.a. 
Participating in open source 
pharmaceutical projects 
0.00 0.00 2.56 n.a. 
Participating in other open source 
communities 
1.28 0.00 0.85 n.a. 
                                                          
7
 In more rigorous terms, let xij be the number of times that benefit i is chosen in marketplace (or 
governance form) j, and ∑ixij the number of times that any benefit is chosen in marketplace (or 
governance form) j; let ∑jxij be the number of times that benefit i is chosen in all marketplaces (or all 
governance forms), and ∑i∑jxij the total number of times any benefit is chosen across all marketplaces 
(or all governance forms). Then, for a certain marketplace (or governance form), the revealed 
marketplace advantage RMA (or revealed governance advantage RGA) index is: RMA/RGA = 
(xij/∑ixij)/(∑jxij/∑i∑jxij). That is, the index is the ratio between the share of benefit i in marketplace (or 
governance form) j and the share of benefit i in all marketplaces (or all governance forms).  
8
 In order to compute the RGA and RMA indexes, the universities’ responses with respect to the 
specific benefits (as listed in Table 2) have been aggregated into the four main categories indicating the 
types of benefits which universities seek through the trade of various forms of IP (also listed in Table 
2: “knowledge transfer”, “competitive positioning”, “innovation” and “financial gain”). 
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Non-patented innovations 0.59 0.31 1.03 0.88 
Releasing not patented product or 
process innovations to the public 
1.01 1.40 0.92 0.77 
Releasing not patented product or 
process innovations to private firms 
0.90 0.93 0.92 1.35 
Using not patented product or 
process innovations 
0.90 0.93 1.31 0.77 
Collaborating with universities 
without patent restrictions 
1.17 0.61 1.02 1.00 
Universities particularly seek financial gain when exchanging patents and copyright 
(and particularly when selling IPR, and out-licensing patents). Instead, universities 
particularly seek innovation benefits when exchanging non-patented innovations 
(especially when using non-patented technology and collaborating with other 
universities), and when engaging in open source. Knowledge transfer, instead, is 
enhanced to a similar extent by the exchange of all forms of IP.  
To provide a quantitative measure of the extent to which specialization in seeking a 
certain benefit is concentrated in one or a few marketplaces or whether a benefit is 
equally sought in different marketplaces we consider the coefficient of variation of 
the RMA index (| RMA/  RMA|). Similarly, for governance forms we use the coefficient 
of variation of the RGA index ( RGA/  RGA 100%). The coefficients of variation are 
reported in Table 10. 
Table 10. Coefficients of variation across governance forms and marketplaces 
Index of governance / marketplace 
specialization 
Knowledge 
transfer 
Competitive 
advantage 
Innovation 
Financial 
gain 
Patents: | RGA/µ RGA| 50.37 138.45 71.57 59.68 
Copyright: | RGA/µ RGA| 26.90 12.21 71.01 28.77 
Open source: | RGA/µ RGA| 88.38 173.21 66.14 n.a. 
Non-patented innovations: | RGA/µ 
RGA| 
12.83 33.71 17.83 28.07 
All forms of IP: | RMA/µ RMA| 30.72 39.70 37.26 71.12 
There is high variability in the index, showing that most categories of benefits are 
quite specific to certain forms of IP, and to certain governance forms. The exception 
is, once again, the fact that knowledge transfer is more equally sought across all 
marketplaces. Also, innovation benefits are sought to a similar extent across all non-
patented governance forms, and competitive advantage benefits are sought to a 
similar extent across all copyright governance forms. 
These results highlight three main patterns regarding the universities’ presumed 
effectiveness of different forms of IP in reaching various strategic benefits: (a) 
proprietary forms of IP are relatively more used in order to enhance flows of financial 
resources; (b) non-proprietary forms of IP are relatively more used effective in order 
to enhance knowledge feedback flows (fostering the universities’ own innovation 
processes); (c) all forms of IP are similarly used in enhancing knowledge transfer 
flows from university to industry. 
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Since enhancing knowledge transfer is a very important objective across all forms of 
IP exchanges (as shown in Table 8) and no type of IP confers a relative advantage in 
enhancing this flow (as shown in Table 9), it is interesting to investigate whether 
other features, such as certain organizational characteristics, are particularly 
correlated to the choice of this objective. Table 11 reports the results of a regression 
that explains the choice of knowledge transfer benefits on the part of the 33 
universities that exchange IP, using as regressors the various types of IP they 
exchange and a set of organizational control variables (age, presence of an internal 
technology transfer office, number of staff engaged in technology transfer, type of 
institution).  
Table 11. Probit regression explaining the choice of knowledge transfer benefits 
 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept)  -0.345 (*) 0.196 -1.761 0.093 
 Patent  0.493 (**) 0.176 2.805 0.011 
 Open source 0.363 (***) 0.113 3.198 0.004 
 Copyright 0.218 (*) 0.108 2.022 0.056 
 Non-patented 
innovations 
0.082 0.119 0.684 0.502 
 Age 0.002 (***) 0.001 3.545 0.002 
 Presence of 
internal TTO 
0.551 (***) 0.131 4.210 0.000 
Number of staff 
in technology 
transfer 
0.003 0.002 1.662 0.111 
 University 
college 
0.139 0.314 0.441 0.664 
 “Old” university  -0.476 (**) 0.192 -2.476 0.022 
 “Plate glass” 
university 
-0.071 0.142 -0.504 0.620 
 ”Former 
polytechnic” 
-0.007 0.116 -0.058 0.954 
n. observations 33    
Log-likelihood 7.965    
AIC 10.069    
Signif. codes: p<0.01 ‘***’ p<0.05 ‘**’ p<0.1  ‘*’ 
As expected, the exchange of all forms of IP is positively related to the likelihood to 
choose knowledge transfer benefits (although the coefficient for the variable 
indicating the exchange of non-patented innovations is not significant). Older 
universities in general seem to be more likely to choose knowledge transfer benefits 
than younger ones. This may indicate that younger and more commercially oriented 
institutions may be less interested in knowledge transfer (and more interested in 
financial gain or competitive positioning). There is no strong effect of the type of 
institution on the likelihood to choose knowledge transfer benefits: the only exception 
is the set of “old” universities founded before 1850 which are also less likely to 
choose these benefits. It may be that old universities, which are more research 
oriented, prefer to transfer knowledge using the traditional scientific publications 
channels, and instead use IP transactions for other objectives.  
Finally, universities that have an internal technology transfer office are significantly 
more likely to seek to enhance knowledge transfer by exchanging IP. This may 
suggest that having dedicated internal facilities for technology transfer is instrumental 
in enhancing knowledge transfer flows. 
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4.5. The experienced efficiency of different IP marketplaces 
Having discussed the use of different forms of IP by universities in enhancing certain 
types of benefits, our dataset also allows us to explore the extent to which they can do 
so efficiently, addressing research question (iv). In practice, we explore what 
obstacles universities encounter when exchanging different forms of IP through 
different governance forms. Focus is on the intensity with which universities face 
various obstacles when exchanging different forms of IP, and the relative significance 
of certain obstacles in each IP marketplace and IP governance form. 
Table 12 summarizes the answers given by respondents with respect to the obstacles 
they encounter when exchanging different forms of IP. Columns do not sum to 100% 
since universities could tick up to five obstacle. Shares greater than 40% are 
highlighted. 
Table 12. Obstacles to the exchange of each form of IP 
 patent Copyright open source 
non-patented 
innovations 
Respondents in each IP 
marketplace 
29 15 12 18 
% % % % 
SEARCH 37.9 13.3 33.3 33.3 
Difficulty in locating owners of 
IP/ technology developers who 
do not enforce IP 
6.9 13.3 8.3 11.1 
Difficulty in locating the users 
of IP/technological solutions 
27.6 6.7 16.7 27.8 
Difficulty in finding the best IP 
or technological solution 
13.8 0.0 25.0 5.6 
TRANSPARENCY 48.3 60.0 33.3 44.4 
Difficulty in assessing the 
degree of originality of the IP 
or technological solution 
31.0 20.0 0.0 22.2 
Description or drawing in the IP 
document is not clear / 
difficulty in understanding non-
patented technological solutions 
as they are not formally 
documented 
0.0 0.0 8.3 16.7 
Difficulty in assessing the 
economic value of the IP or 
technological solution 
44.8 53.3 25.0 33.3 
CONTRACT NEGOTIATION 41.4 46.7 8.3 38.9 
Difficulty in negotiating a price 
for the IP or technological 
solution 
27.6 46.7 0.0 38.9 
Difficulty in negotiating the 
terms (not related to price) of 
the exchange contract 
31.0 13.3 8.3 16.7 
CONTRACT 27.6 26.7 33.3 27.8 
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ENFORCEMENT 
Excessive cost of enforcing the 
exchange contract 
10.3 20.0 0.0 16.7 
Problems (not related to cost) 
with enforcing the exchange 
contract 
6.9 0.0 8.3 5.6 
Trust issues (e.g. opportunistic 
behaviour, free-riding, or 
similar) 
0.0 6.7 25.0 11.1 
REGULATION AND 
PRACTICES 
3.4 20.0 8.3 5.6 
Differences in practices of 
firms 
10.3 6.7 16.7 0.0 
Regulations allow too exclusive 
rights 
0.0 0.0 8.3 5.6 
International IP regulations do 
not fit the needs of different 
local markets 
3.4 13.3 8.3 5.6 
 
All obstacles are found in all marketplaces, although the intensity with which they are 
experienced varies. In the case of proprietary IP, the most frequent obstacles involve 
lack of transparency, and particularly the difficulty in assessing the economic value of 
IPR (44.8% of respondents engaged in the patent marketplace, and 53.3% of 
respondents engaged in the copyright marketplace), followed by contract negotiation 
issues (46.7% report difficulties in negotiating a price for copyright). While in the 
theoretical literature IPR exchange is often assumed to be perfectly transparent and 
characterized by a perfect flow of information, it seems that in real IPR marketplaces 
organizations encounter numerous problems. This is consistent with results from the 
empirical literature (Cockburn, 2007). 
Also in the case of non-patented innovations, universities mostly find problems 
relating to lack of transparency and contract negotiation: assessing the economic 
value of IP and negotiating a price for it are important to 33.3% and 38.9% 
respectively). Instead, in the case of open source universities indicate problems with 
search (25% encounter difficulties in finding the best open source projects), lack of 
transparency (25% find it difficult to assess economic value) and contract 
enforcement (25% find it difficult to trust the other parties involved; this is probably 
related to the risk that open source participants may appropriate and close up the 
source code, or fail to apply the same terms and conditions to derivative works). Thus, 
the risk of opportunistic behaviour in the open source marketplace appears to be quite 
high. 
The same obstacles are found with similar intensity when exchanging patents, 
copyright and non-patented innovations, while in the case of open source other 
obstacles are prevalent. This is confirmed by the analysis of the relative importance of 
certain obstacles when exchanging specific forms of IP, performed by computing an 
index similar to the “revealed marketplace advantage” index mentioned earlier, only 
this time with respect to obstacles. Hence, we call it “revealed marketplace 
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disadvantage” index (RMD)9. The RMD index calculates the experienced significance 
of an obstacle in a certain IP marketplace relative to the overall significance of this 
obstacle across all IP marketplaces. The results are reported in Table 14. 
Table 14. “Revealed disadvantage index” for the various obstacles 
Form of IP RMD index 
 Search 
Transparen
cy 
Contract 
negotiation 
Contract 
enforcemen
t 
Regulation 
Patents 1.16 0.97 1.08 0.93 0.41 
Copyright 0.39 1.15 1.16 0.85 2.24 
Open source 1.39 0.91 0.30 1.52 1.33 
Non-patented technology 1.08 0.95 1.08 0.99 0.69 
All marketplaces: | RMD/µ RMD| 42.89 10.64 45.02 28.47 69.66 
 
In the case of patents, copyright, and non-patented innovations search and contract 
negotiation obstacles are relatively more important (transparency and contract 
negotiation in the case of copyright). In the case of open source, the obstacles that are 
relatively more important are transparency, contract enforcement and regulation (most 
of the obstacles reported concern open source software, which is probably the area 
where universities have the greatest experience). The coefficient of variation of the 
RMA indicates that obstacles are generally specific to forms of IP, with the exception 
of transparency problems (mainly related to the difficulty in assessing the economic 
value of IP) which are similarly important for all forms of IP. 
As universities encounter obstacles with similar intensity across all forms of IP, none 
of these forms of IP appears to be more efficient than the others. To some extent, 
there are differences in which obstacles are relatively more important for certain 
forms of IP, suggesting that further investigations into the problems that universities 
encounter when exchanging different forms of IP can provide useful indications to 
policymakers who wish to intervene to improve the functioning of these 
marketplaces. 
 
5. Conclusions 
While most of the analyses of the ways in which universities transfer knowledge to 
the economic system focus either on their use of patents or on their use of traditional 
knowledge dissemination channels based on publications, the empirical analysis 
developed in this article focuses on a variety of forms of IP.  
Our evidence suggests that most universities that exchange IP rely on a variety of 
forms of IP. This is especially so for larger universities, for universities that focus on 
a wider variety of disciplines and have greater research intensity or greater business 
orientation. 
                                                          
9
 In order to compute the RGD and RMD indexes, the universities’ responses with respect to obstacles 
have been aggregated into five main categories (“search”, “transparency”, “contract negotiation”, 
“contract enforcement”, “regulation”).  
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Universities derive specific and different benefits from the exchange of different 
forms of IP, suggesting that they complement each other. While the fact that 
universities still seem to patent only a small part of their discoveries is sometimes 
attributed to their lack of awareness and to their inability to use these instruments, the 
result that we have presented, however, suggest that alternative channels for the 
transfer of IP are used because they confer specific advantages that are not obtainable 
by patenting. 
In particular, proprietary forms of IP are relatively more used in generating financial 
benefits to universities, while non-proprietary forms of IP are relatively more used in 
enhancing the flows of knowledge from industry to university, fostering the 
universities’ own innovation processes. All forms of IP are used in order to transfer 
knowledge.  
Universities that particularly seek to transfer knowledge from the exchange of IP are 
older and have internal technology transfer competencies. The underlying rationale 
for the implementation of regulations creating incentives for universities to protect 
their IP through patents and copyright was to encourage dissemination of knowledge 
(Berman, 2008; Schacht, 2005). However we found that also non-proprietary 
marketplaces offer universities important opportunities to build and strengthen 
relationships with industry and with the wider community. Since universities very 
often choose to embed their knowledge outcomes in forms of IP that are different 
from both patents and publications, like open source and non-patented technology, 
and they do so in order to transfer knowledge to industry, these forms of non-
proprietary IP cannot simply be assumed to be less efficient than patents in 
knowledge transfer. Indeed, our results challenge whether patents are actually the best 
tool for knowledge dissemination (as suggested by Bayh-Dole) or whether instead it 
would be more appropriate to encourage universities to use non-proprietary 
marketplaces more intensively than proprietary ones.  
Universities encounter obstacles when exchanging all forms of IP: none of these 
exchanges appear to be particularly efficient. The exchanges of patents, copyright and 
non-patented innovations are mainly affected by similar problems. Hence we do not 
find support for the claim that embedding knowledge into IPRs “automatically” 
generates efficient markets, since exchanges of IPRs are affected by the same 
problems as exchanges of non-patented innovations. Such problems are not easily 
solved by interventions aiming at strengthening the market institutions, but may be 
intrinsic to marketplaces where knowledge goods are traded. Instead, open source 
communities appear to be mainly affected by a different set of problems. Because 
obstacles are very often IP marketplace-specific and IP governance-specific, these 
policies should not be “one size fits all” but tailored to specific forms of IP and to 
specific types of transactions.  
Therefore, better understanding of the processes of knowledge transfer from academia 
to other economic agents such as industry, and conversely also of knowledge and 
financial gains flow from industry to academia via feedback processes, requires 
policy, management and research to take into account a greater variety of forms of IP 
than have been considered so far (focusing especially on the participation in open 
source communities and on the exchange of non-patented innovations).  
Also, information on the engagement in open source projects and on the exchange of 
non-patented innovations is not typically collected by those surveys that seek to 
quantify the amount of invention or knowledge transfer performed by universities and 
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other related variables. By neglecting these channels, however, we risk missing an 
important part of the knowledge transfer process. 
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